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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRESERVING NATIVE
AMERICAN CULTURAL AND ARCHEOLOGICAL
ARTIFACTS
Robert L. Cooper
"An Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities" became law
on June 8, 19o6.1 This act made it illegal for anyone to appropriate,
excavate, or otherwise harm any ". . . historic or prehistoric ruin or
monument, or any object of antiquity situated on Government
lands ...2 without the requisite permission granted by the desig-
nated Cabinet-level Secretary.3 Although this law, which is now
Section 433 of Title 36 of the United States Code, has been on the
books for seventy years, United States v. Diaz' is the only case which
has been reported in federal courts concerning this statute. In that
case, Ben Diaz was initially convicted before a United States mag-
istrate of appropriating an "object of antiquity" from government
lands without permission. The land involved was the San Carlos
Apache Reservation in Arizona, and the "objects of antiquity" were
several ceremonial masks apparently made by reservation Native
Americans. These masks had been hidden in a cave and had sub-
stantial religious significance to the Apaches.
The issue presented on appeal3 was whether the objects taken were
in reality "objects of antiquity." In the first appeal6 (herein referred
to as Diaz I), it was pointed out that the objects had been made in
1969 or 197o. 7 This, the defense argued, precluded the objects from
being "antiquities." However, the court accepted the testimony of a
professor of anthropology at the University of Arizona that age
should not be the sole determinant of whether something is an object
of antiquity. Rather, the court stated, the use to which an item is put,
its socio-religious importance, and its place in a people's cultural
heritage are as much determinants of antiquity as age." In affirming
the conviction in Diaz I, the court stated, "In such a case as this there
can be no specific definite time limit as to when an object becomes
an antiquity."
Diaz appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals (Diaz 11)10 on the issue of the district court's con-
ception and definition of "object of antiquity." In a short opinion
the circuit court reversed the district court on the grounds that the
statute relied upon was unconstitutionally vague 1 and stated, "No-
where do we find any definition of such terms as 'ruin' or 'monument'
(whether historic or prehistoric) or 'object of antiquity.' ",12 How-
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ever, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, the circuit court
offered no guidance in arriving at a proper definition. The court (in
Diaz II) obviously decided that a ceremonial mask made in 1969 or
197o would not fit under the definition of "object of antiquity" as
that term is commonly perceived. Apparently, to allow a mask of
recent vintage to be declared an object of antiquity due to its socio-
religious importance or its place in a people's cultural heritage would
create a situation similar to that which the circuit court envisioned
when they stated, "Hobbyists who explore the desert and its ghost
towns for arrowheads and antique bottles would arguably find them-
selves within the Act's proscriptions."'" The court presumed that
bottles and other such items were not intended to be covered by
the Act.
The intent of Congress in passing the Act is not clear. There was
no debate in the Senate on the bill, 4 and the only debated issue in
the House was whether this Act would prevent public lands from
being sold.15 In the House debate, however, it was stated that the
bill was intended to cover cliff dwellers and cave dwellers of the
Southwest and their ruins, monuments, objects of antiquity, and
"other objects of special importance."' 6 The rules and regulations
proscribed to carry out the provisions of the Act refer to ruins,
archeological sites, monuments, structures, objects of antiquity, and
"... other objects of historic or scientific interest."' 7 Clearly the
masks involved in the Diaz case would fall within the definition of
"other objects of historic or scientific interest." The problem is that
these words, which would have given the statute broader coverage,
were omitted from the literal language of the statute. The statute is
literally limited to ruins, monuments, and objects of antiquity.'8
It is possible, however, that the statute would still be unconstitu-
tionally vague even with the inclusion of such language. Antique
bottles and arrowheads would still qualify as objects of scientific or
historical interest. A real need exists for statutory protection of
Native American ruins, structures, objects of antiquity, and other
objects or artifacts of archeological and/or cultural significance, but
the difficulty lies in distinguishing between those objects which are
of sufficient interest to deserve protection and those which are not
or are of little real significance.
Several states have attempted to draw this line by statutory means.
Colorado,'9 New Mexico,20 Arizona,2' Oklahoma,22 and other states
have statutes which purport to have the same effect as Section 433 of
Title 16 of the United States Code. The Oklahoma law, for example,
states that
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No person shall wilfully or knowingly break, break off, crack, carve
upon, write, or otherwise mark upon, or in any manner damage,
destroy, multilate, deface, mar or harm any historic or prehistoric
site, building, object, artifact or material in, around or upon any
historic site owned, operated, managed or under the control of the
Oklahoma Historical Society, and any person violating any of
the provisions hereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be punished by a fine of not to exceed Two Hundred Dollars
($2oo.oo) or by confinement in the county jail for not to exceed
thirty (30) days or by both such fine and confinement.23
Historic and prehistoric sites, buildings, objects, artifacts, and materi-
als are protected by the terms of this law; surely Apache ceremonial
masks would fall within this definition. The term "artifact" is a
very useful word in this context. It connotes objects and materials,
whether ancient or not, and is broad enough to encompass all man-
made objects worthy of protection. The term "artifact" should cer-
tainly be included in any new law passed by Congress to remedy the
unenforceability of this Act.
The passage of a new bill is imperative to insure the proper main-
tenance and preservation of Native American cultural and archeo-
logical items. If it is true that a people's present and future can best
be understood by careful analysis of its past, then the preservation of
items such as Apache ceremonial masks is vitally important. Just as
important is the deterrence of "pot-hunting,"24 which ruins thou-
sands of archelogical sites. Wanton excavation and appropriation of
artifacts from a site results in the loss of valuable information con-
cering the lives of the makers of the artifacts. Archeological recon-
struction of the past depends, to a great extent, on the finding and
study of artifacts "in situ" or in place and their comparison with other
artifacts in various levels of the dig and with artifacts from other
sites. The archeologist builds a time sequence by digging through
layers of earth 2 5 amateur excavators disturb the location of artifacts
and remove them from their place so that accurate time schedules
are very difficult to create. Nothing is more disconcerting to an
archeologist than to painstakingly study various levels of a site excava-
tion, formulate theories, and then discover a beer can in the bottom
layer. All the information acquired to that point would suddenly be
very suspect if not completely worthless. 6
Pot-hunters are often proud of the fact that they may have a piece
of Pre-Colombian statuary or a piece of ancient Native American
pottery in their home or in a museum with their name on a plaque
underneathY.2 The object may be extremely beautiful, but if it was
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obtained without employing the proper archeological information-
gathering procedure, the importance of that object as a useful tool
with which to study man's past is practically worthless.
Thus, a new law replacing Section 433 is urgently needed to insure
the protection of Native American and other archeological or anthro-
pological items, whether ruins, monuments, objects of antiquity,
modem ceremonial masks, or even antique bottles. The scope of the
law must necessarily be broad for maximum protection 28-antique
bottles may also provide valuable information. Oklahoma's statute
or those of a few other states would provide excellent models for a
new federal statute pertaining to American antiquities.
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